Strategy in Afghanistan

[Stu]

“I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.” President Obama announcing his Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, 27 March 2009.

President Obama looks to Lincoln for inspiration in a number of areas but the conduct of Overseas Contingency Operations – a new and politically correct euphemism for combat operations against terrorists – apparently isn’t one of them.

Presidents and their military leaders do not always speak the same language. It is therefore critical that the former clearly articulate what Soldiers refer to as “commanders intent”. Clear and unambiguous directives are required to frame the strategy and battlefield calculus required to achieve the goals of what Carl von Clausewitz termed “politics by other means”.

To defeat someone militarily means to force him to change plans. It doesn’t mean you lessen his available forces, capabilities, or ability to influence what you do.

On the other hand, to destroy means to eliminate at least 10% of his forces (aka decimate). This isn’t a petty parsing of words. When this level of damage is inflicted, the result is an enemy who is rendered ineffective until reconstituted. And that means he can no longer dictate the terms of the engagement. The best way to do this is to attack an enemy relentlessly wherever he is and to use every element of national power, including overwhelming combat power. No sanctuary is given and none should be expected. Unfortunately, non-combatants will die and collateral damage will occur (e.g., Dresden, Hiroshima). But as long as mankind exists, wars will occur and this remains the most effective way to shorten a conflict, limit overall casualties, and impose your will on an enemy.

President Obama repeatedly uses the word defeat and continues to limit US civilian agencies and military forces on where they may go and what they may do to win the war. He doesn’t use the word destroy and this is where he parts company with Lincoln.

President Lincoln had a laser-like focus on the destruction of the confederate armies and went through several generals before he found one who could grasp his intent and shape a campaign to achieve that end-state. Ulysses S. Grant subsequently tasked Generals Sherman and Meade to remain on the offensive and focused on the destruction of General Johnston’s and Lee’s armies respectively. The conduct of Sherman’s campaign was especially unpopular and he is arguably best remembered for the scorched earth tactics he conducted to achieve his objective. The fact remains that he accomplished the mission and helped hasten the end of the Civil War.

President Karzai has praised the “new” US strategy but specifically mentions only two components; increased civil and military aid and reconciliation with moderate Taliban elements. Unfortunately, regional politics continues to deflect the focus from destroying Taliban forces infrastructure and influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan and thus lessen their ability to recruit and conduct global terror operations.

In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John Nagy (US Army, Retired) contrasts how the British defeated an insurgency in Malaya in the 1950 with America’s unsuccessful efforts to do the same in Vietnam in the 1960s. The strategic center of gravity in an insurgency is winning the support of the population; not killing insurgents. That doesn’t mean however that you eschew combat operations. Rather, this indirect approach strengthens ties with the population, facilitates governance and capacity building, and increases actionable intelligence and an ability to then focus combat power when and where it is needed.

Thanks in large measure to General Petraeus, the US military (finally) applied these lessons in Iraq. The strategic shift was a few years late but starting with The Surge has proven successful.

A different surge is occurring in Afghanistan. General Petraeus is leveraging the counter insurgency tenets learned in Iraq as adjusted for Afghanistan. The crux however remains the subordination of military actions to political goals; the importance of establishing security; and a “lead from behind” (by, with, through) approach to training and empowering the government, military and police.

President Lincoln ultimately found his generals. It seems President Obama has too. Generals Petraeus and McChrystal understand his strategic vision and the need to press the fight. Now the President must allow them to what it takes to support Ambassador Eikenberry and destroy the enemy's political, para-military, economic, social, information and infrastructure support, restrict his physical environment, and deny him the time required to conduct effective operations and sustain popular support.

Debate rages in Washington over enhanced interrogation techniques, the efficacy of GITMO, use of military tribunals, and the like. Our elected leaders and fellow citizens need to remember that, no matter how you package it, Overseas Contingency Operations are still warfare, especially in an era of persistent conflict.

Still Serving, Army Strong!

Stu McLennan
Harker heights

[Stu]

Sadly, President Obama was justified in relieving GEN McChrystal.

President Truman faced a similar situation in 1951 when a letter written by GEN MacArthur criticized his limited-war strategy. MacArthur was relieved five days later.

Our founders wrote extensively in the Federalist Papers about their concerns with standing armies therefore the Constitution subordinates the military to civilian control. (See Article 1, Section 8 ) Command authority is vested in the executive branch and funding in the legislative branch. Military personnel therefore owe institutional loyalty to our elected and appointed representatives, regardless of whether we like them personally or agree with their policies.

If a military leader engages the Commander in Chief directly yet fails to resolve an issue, and if the leader believes the resulting schism negatively impacts his ability to command, assigned mission or the lives of those entrusted to him, then that leader should resign. They are then free to voice their opinion. But to first voice dissent publically while in active service and in a senior command billet is inexcusable.

If what is reported is true, it was ill advised for GEN McChrystal to allow unfettered access to a reporter and to speak on the record so frankly. And his staff then didn't help matters. As LTG Russ Honore said during the Katrina clean up, "You can't fix stupid". Even senior officers can, at times, behave stupidly by not controlling their mouths or zippers.

GEN McChrystal and his "irreverent and profane" staff came mainly from the Special Operations community; a brotherhood known for its candor and audacity; contempt for poor leadership, indecision and weakness; and unconventional thoughts and actions. But most importantly for its ability to accomplish the mission. Some in the "conventional" military may call them Cowboys. But there is a place for Cowboys, especially in counter-insurgency warfare.

Unfortunately, GEN McChrystal chose to vent his frustration publically and thus potentially mask nuggets of truth in what he said. Things that grated on him may have included a lack of strategic vision; weak or ineffective leadership from the White House; political infighting and erosion of support in Congress and the Department of State; overly restrictive Rules of Engagement; and an international community that allows the enemy sanctuary in Pakistan.

As addressed above, President Obama fired GEN McKiernan and brought in GEN McChrystal because he wanted someone who shared his vision. Something changed for GEN McChrystal to self-destruct like he did. Given the political and military focal shift from Iraq to Afghanistan, that change was likely political, not military.

GEN Petraeus, another proven combat commander, will now assume command of ISAF – a subordinate command of CENTCOM. He was in a box; you don’t balk when the President asks. Now he either gets to do both jobs or await a replacement at CENTCOM. We need to pray he doesn’t burn out.

GEN McChrystal was a respected and capable leader and combat commander. We should also not allow the relevant and causal factors that led to his implosion to be lost in the cacophony of political and media noise that continues to emanate from Washington DC. Remedy begins in November.

Still Serving, Army Strong!

Stu McLennan
Harker Heights

[Stu]

General McChrystal’s relief still leaves us with relevant questions and second and third order effects.

What should it tell us about our national strategy, civilian leadership, and unity of effort when a General implodes and the President must chastise his National Security Team and order them to “play nicely” with others?

Which is more important – winning this war and then rebuilding a country or sustaining Rules of Engagement that protect civilians but hamstring our military, increase casualties, and sap our national will, resolve and resources?

When will we stop dancing around the majority of this war that emanates from Pakistan? Increasing Predator strikes – and likely covert intelligence and special operations – is not enough. And it’s certainly not ”brilliant”.

Is General Petraeus the only Army general who can lead ISAF and accomplish the mission in Afghanistan? In 2003, General Eric Shinseki, then Chief of Staff – Army, clashed with Secretary Rumsfeld over post-war strategy in Iraq and then opted to retire. President Bush and Rumsfeld then brought General Peter Schoomaker out of his initial retirement in 2000 to replace General Shinseki. The message was clear – No active duty Army generals were considered worthy enough to Charlie Mike (continue the mission). Whether he knows it or not, President Obama is now sending the same message.

General Petraeus is being demoted, in position if not function. The chain of command flows from the President to, in order, the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and commander of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is one of seven commands subordinate to CENTCOM. ISAF is certainly the current priority but moving General Petraeus will likely limit or remove his ability to affect the remainder of the USCENTCOM area of responsibility including the Middle East and parts of Central Asia and Africa.

Moving General Petraeus may make sense politically but it also poses challenges to military leaders. He will now either wear two hats – CENTCOM and ISAF -- or the President will need to designate a replacement at CENTCOM. If the latter, then the SecDef, CJCS and next USCENTCOM commander will have to accept the direct connection that now exists between ISAF and the White House regarding information flow, decision making, and resourcing.

Today’s media lacks respected military correspondents like Ernie Pyle, Thomas Ricks and Joseph Galloway. Reporters with agendas continue to exercise poor judgment with reports from the battlefield and this erodes the bonds of trust and confidence that must exist with the military. Unfortunately, the American people seem willing to tolerate the negative strategic consequences that result from “gotcha” reporting. And justified or not, Rolling Stone’s behavior will likely have a chilling effect on the imbed program and widen the chasm that exists between the military and self-promoting Fourth Estate.

Finally, this war is a multi-generational marathon, not a 5-10 year sprint. If we ride our military and their families too hard and too long, especially our most senior leaders who often are not on a unit rotation schedule, then we risk accelerating their “tracer burnout”. Holly Petraeus has reportedly seen her husband an average of 30 days a year for much of the past decade. The wives, children and families of other senior leaders have experienced similar separations. Regardless of funding and sentiments of support, how much can we reasonably expect our military and its senior leaders to endure?

Food for thought.

Still Serving, Army Strong!

Stu McLennan
Harker Heights

[Stu]

Some believe Gen McChrystal’s actions were intentional to cause a shift in our national strategy and thus desired changes in military operations and tactics.

I’m not into Black Helicopters but it does make for good coffee talk.

Generals are normally pilloried (or ignored) for opting to retire before speaking “truth to power”, usually on cable news. The Rolling Stone article is but a single data point of dissent. Where is the proof that GEN McChystal had not previously voiced his concerns directly with President Obama and the chain of command? It is interesting to note the total lack of smiles in the pictures of them together.

We should not attribute the restrictive ROE and ludicrous “courageous restraint” medal solely to GEN McChystal. The ROE were his to set but had to align with and support US, NATO and Afghan political directives. The medal was the brain-cramp of British Major General Nick Carter, commander of British forces in Afghanistan. How about we adjust the ROE so we don’t need a medal. This would make a good Monty Python skit if the subject weren’t so serious.

It is unlikely that GEN McChrystal and his staff, mostly seasoned special ops warriors from the US and Britain, were so frustrated that they acted stupidly in Paris and Berlin after “one too many martinis”. Regardless of being on or off the record, Peter Hastings is likely neither as cunning nor persuasive as would be required to get these kind of men to gush feelings like they were on Oprah.

Like all things dealing with the Black Ops environment, the facts are not and may never be fully revealed. A clue though might be if these patriots just nod, clear their weapons, adjust their gear, and walk silently off the ramp.

There are worse things than being relieved.

GEN McChrystal announced his retirement last week. He served well and with distinction and it’s a loss for our country that it ended this way.

Still Serving, Army strong!


Stu McLennan
Harker Heights